Crisis Management Organization: Building Governance Capacity and Legitimacy

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Foreword

This paper is written as part of the project on «Organizing for internal security and crisis management. Governance Capacity and Legitimacy» (GOVCAP) funded by the SAMRISK II program, Norwegian Research Council. It was presented at the international conference on «Next Steps for Public Administration in Theory and Practice: Looking Backward and Moving Forward», 16–18 November 2014,Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou, China

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of what makes a well-functioning governmental crisis-management system. A core argument is that such a system needs both governance capacity and legitimacy. To achieve an institutional design that ensures the necessary governance capacity for crisis management, the focus must be on the structure and performance of governmental authorities, based on the assumption that organizational arrangements affect performance. To this end, the various types of management situation and crisis must be identified. What is considered sufficient capacity and good performance – and which tools are needed to achieve those objectives – can vary significantly. Our aim is to contribute to this line of research by taking governance, institutional and organizational aspects into account. We apply a broad organization-theory approach that has both instrumental and institutional components. Core concepts such as crisis, «wicked problems», coordination and specialization are discussed. A central argument is that context matters and that there is no single organizational solution for crisis management that can be considered optimal in all situations. This argument is supported by the case of Norwegian crisis management arrangements.

Introduction

This paper addresses the broad research question of what makes a well-functioning governmental crisis-management system. Our core argument is that a robust and well-functioning administrative structure needs both organizational capacity and legitimacy. This is true of crisis management in general and of central crisis management in particular. To elaborate this argument, we highlight the importance of organizational capacity by focusing on the organization and coordination of public resources, decision-making systems and governance tools to deal with crises. We underscore the relevance of legitimacy by examining public perceptions, attitudes and trust relations towards societal safety, security and resilience.1 Major crises may sound, and often result in, a democracy alarm and highlight that a well-functioning democracy needs a well-functioning administrative apparatus as well as high levels of trust in government (Olsen, 2014). Capacity is necessary but must stand in a dynamic relationship to legitimacy and trust.

Within the administrative apparatus of crisis management, tensions persist to which there is no optimal or general solution; between resilience and prevention, societal safety/security and individual rights, centralization and decentralization, specialization by purpose and territory, integration and fragmentation, horizontal and vertical coordination, regular situations and irregular situations, high impact and low probability, as well as between important organizational goals – to create a system that is lean and purposeful, honest and fair, and robust and resilient, for example. It is difficult to satisfy all these values within one organizational design (Hood, 1991). A general theory that can explain the causes of all crises and how crises are best managed and through which type of organization does not exist. Thus in the context of societal safety and crisis management, we need to distinguish between the various types of situations and crisis. This approach recognizes that one type of crisis can differ significantly from another, for example natural disasters and terrorism. What is considered sufficient capacity and good performance – and which tools are needed to achieve those objectives – may vary too. In this paper, we explore and identify some relevant factors that may enhance or constrain an effective and well-functioning crisis management system.

Dealing with crises is a core responsibility of governments, policymakers, civil servants and executive staff within the public sector. But crisis management is not an easy task. Planning and preparing for the unexpected and unknown, dealing with uncertainty and ambiguity, and responding to urgency, tests the limits of what bureaucratic public administration is designed to do (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013; Taleb, 2007). Crises and disasters are increasingly cutting across geographical, administrative, infrastructural and cultural borders (Ansell, 2011; Ansell, Boin and Keller, 2010; Boin et al., 2005; Fimreite et al., 2014; Head, 2008). For this reason, societal safety and crisis management can be

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1 Societal safety is a particular Norwegian concept developed over the last decade, defined as: «The society's ability to maintain critical social functions, to protect the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens' basic requirements in a variety of stress situations» (Olsen, Kruke and Hovden 2007). In the following, we use this concept to cover public safety, internal security and crisis management.

seen to pose a typical «wicked problem» (Rittel and Webber, 1973; Xiang, 2013), in which coordination between actors and organizations whose tasks and perceptions differ is crucial. Moreover, crises tend to be unpredictable, demand rapid response and often spark considerable criticism and debate about how they were handled. Public organizations face major constraints in dealing with such complexities, frequently devising hybrid organizational solutions that may combine principles pointing in different directions.

Because of the increasing complexity of the crises themselves, increasing complex relations in society (Perrow, 1984) and the growing complexity of the public sector (Christensen and Lægreid, 2010), crises typically challenge existing patterns of organization and management. Crises typically challenge existing patterns of organization and management because they do not fit easily into established organizational contexts. Ultimately, decisions on how to organize, regulate and prepare for crises and how to respond to them involve priorities and values and are therefore inherently political or «critical» decisions (Selznick, 1957). Working across existing organizational borders and taking into account multi-level governance relations and the need for cooperation is crucial.

According to public administration research, an increased focus within the public sector on inter-organizational coordination, network solutions and reforms – such as whole-of-government emphasis on more holistic approaches – influences the policy area (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). Owing to increasing complexity, policymakers, regulators and administrators struggle to establish adequate administrative structures to facilitate a coordinated response; and, in the case of crises and disasters, they try to combine organizational stability and crisis preparedness with flexibility and rapid response, which reveals that there is frequently a gap between central plans and local challenges (Boin, 2008).

In this paper, we examine what makes a government's crisis management system well-functioning and effective. First, we outline an organizational approach to crisis management by distinguishing between a structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional perspective. Second, we explore the concept of crisis and the potential for developing a crisis typology that could be used to formulate adequate strategies for dealing with complex crises. Third, we discuss how to deal with "wicked problems" and the particular challenges of specialization and coordination in crisis management. Fourth, we address the need to focus on governance capacity and legitimacy. Fifth, we illustrate the theoretical and conceptual issues by addressing Norwegian crisis management. Finally, we draw some conclusions.

An organizational approach to crisis management

The available literature on crisis development and management is primarily descriptive but at times prescriptive and normative as well. It is typically oriented towards single events and specific sectors and/or organizations, or devoted to the ex post evaluation of responses to specific crises. Theoretically informed empirical research on core topics such as resilience is quite rare (Boin and Van Eeten, 2013). Broad approaches – such as «high reliability theory» and «normal accident theory», which focus on complexity, tight coupling and

reliability – are common (Boin, 2008; Rijpma, 1997; Roe and Schulman, 2008), but there is lack of generally accepted definitions of key concepts (Boin, 2004).A tested general theory on crisis management does not exist. Crisis research has tended to concentrate on the technical/managerial or strategic/political security perspective ('t Hart and Sundelius, 2013; Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2014). Organizational studies focusing on public-administration crisis management is less common. An exception is the EU project «Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe» or ANVIL (Bossong and Hegemann, 2013), which concludes that it is difficult to find a strong correlation between specific structural arrangements and system performance.

We argue that a broad organization-theory approach is crucial for understanding how crises are dealt with (Christensen et al., 2007; Olsen, 2010). This approach begins with the assertion that societal safety and crisis management are framed in specific institutional, political and organizational contexts that influence performance in different ways. The complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of societal safety and crisis management is defined and tackled within and across organizations and sectoral/ministerial areas of responsibility and at various administrative levels with specific characteristics and are influenced by legitimacy issues. Crisis management takes place in the interface between policy areas and administrative levels. Thus the organizational layout of the societal safety field and coordination between the various organizations that make up that field are of fundamental importance.

A concept of bounded rationality assumes that organizations are biased (Simon, 1947). Organizations are not neutral tools in the hands of political and administrative executive institutions but are infused with values and are robust in the face of new steering signals from executives and changing external pressures (Selznick, 1957; March and Olsen, 1989). Organization is therefore not merely a technical and logistical issue but rather an issue of political priority, attention, coordination, capacity and legitimacy. Organizational arrangements and cultures constrain and enable actions and affect prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. For their part, citizens' attitudes towards governmental arrangements and their level of trust in central institutions influence decisions on organization and policy and affect judgments about their success or failure. Organizations and decisions on organizational arrangements may exacerbate crises but at the same time may reduce loss or damage.

The field of societal safety constitutes a complex structure of actors and organizations, each of which has its own distinct profile (Allison, 1971). In general, we are confronted with a vast array of principles of specialization and coordination and a conglomerate of semi-autonomous and loosely coupled organizations. The ability to execute formal authority and responsibility is constrained by basic organizational dilemmas and trade-offs (Kettl, 2003), while there are permanent tensions between different values and administrative doctrines (Olsen, 2010 and 2014). The various types of coordination and specialization matter for performance (Bouckaert et al., 2010), and multi-level governance influences relations between actors (Bache and Flinders, 2005). Standard operating procedures are important but may imply sequential attention, local rationality, biased search and constraints on information, options for action and implementation capacity (Cyert and March, 1963). Organizational and institutional changes within the public sector result from a combination

of organizational constraints, cultural features, external shocks and deliberate executive choices (Christensen et al., 2007). Such change processes may be abrupt or incremental and may result in continuity or discontinuity (Streeck and Thelen, 2005); further, they may be related to context or display features of path dependence and institutionalization (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Krasner, 1988) and affect crisis management performance in profound ways. It follows that a core research challenge is to study the institutionalization of various crisis domains and arrangements, the changes that develop within those structures and the consequences and effects of those changes.

In our organization-theory approach, a central argument is that context matters (Pollitt, 2013; Christensen and Lægreid, 2013). It assumes that organizations are embedded in institutional contexts that provide legitimacy and seek to comply with institutional expectations through a «logic of appropriateness» (March and Olsen, 1989). Based on this contextual approach, it could be expected that variations in crisis management depend not only on national risk, which combines exposure and vulnerability to hazard with assessment of the various types of threat, but also on administrative culture, polity features, and public assessment of government performance. We also expect variations across type of risk or crisis – whether man-made or natural, small- or large-scale, contained or cross-boundary, regular or irregular – as well as variations in the phases of crisis management.

A common distinction in organization theory is that between a structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional perspective (Christensen et al., 2007). From the *structural-instrumental* perspective, emphasis is on how the formal-normative structure of public administration influences decision-making processes by channeling attention and shaping frames of references and attitudes among decision-makers acting within the confines of bounded rationality (Egeberg, 2012; March and Simon, 1993; Scott, 2003). Organizations are seen as instruments established for a specific purpose and with the intention of achieving certain goals. According to this point of view, the general challenges facing actors are, above all, related to control problems (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953): Attempts at hierarchical steering in decision-making processes may be difficult because of internal and external heterogeneity. Internally, leaders and other actors may disagree about goals and the means with which to achieve them and/or about problems and how to solve them; those disagreements result in negotiation processes and compromises (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Olsen, 1983). Another challenge is rational calculation or clear organizational thinking. Goals, problems, solutions and decision opportunities may be ambiguous and fluctuating, as a result of which decisions themselves may be unpredictable (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972). Superstitious learning may be evident, or leaders may be struggling with their capacity and attention to the extent that rational aspects of actors' thinking are modified (March and Olsen, 1975). All these factors may influence crisis management performance.

In general, the structural-instrumental perspective can be used to describe and analyze how crisis management is formally organized, including both vertical and horizontal specialization and coordination. Relevant questions are: What are the specific formal features that differentiate government organizations responsible for societal safety and crisis management from their counterparts in other policy sectors? Are the challenges of complexity and hybridity particularly strong in this field? Do the typical challenges of crisis

management – that is, dealing with unpredictable and fluctuating situations – make instrumental action more problematic? And do the instrumental and formal arrangements work as intended?

The *cultural-institutional* perspective focuses more on the constraints to structural-instrumental organization-building. It emphasizes the embedding of political-administrative systems in historically evolved and distinct informal properties that provide direction for, and give meaning to, organized activities (Selznick, 1957). The importance of informal norms is often related not only to the development of internal professional cultures but also to pressure from important stake-holders - or to both of these factors. Decision-making is seen as oriented towards logics of appropriateness and dictated by informal roles and identities (March and Olsen, 1989 and 2006). Such informal norms may both undermine and contradict formal ones, but at the same time they may support and reinforce the behavioral implications of the formal normative structure. Thus cultural norms within organizations may both enable and constrain action, as is emphasized through the notion of «path dependency», where cultural *roots* heavily influence the *routes* that are taken (Krasner, 1988). Changes do not occur as a result of quick and easy rational adaptation to political signals or external pressure. Organizations are robust and resist change, as a result there is often a mismatch between problem and organizational structure that is seen as «historical inefficiency» (March and Olsen, 1989). Cultural compatibility is crucial, meaning that changes to and reforms of institutions must reflect the fit between current and potentially new cultural features (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). New cultural norms are often adjusted to old ones in a pragmatic manner.

There are several ways we can approach this issue. First, we can focus more generally on some of the crisis management strategies of the past and try to determine which informal norms and values have dominated over time and how change-resistant they have been. Might cultural-institutional features explain why formal and structural-instrumental goals have not been achieved? Second, we can seek to establish the special cultural features of the policy area of crisis management. Are they special in that overall, this policy area is more multi-sectoral and multi-level than other areas, reflecting a more heterogeneous culture? Or are those special features related to a particularly strong tension between central planning and local flexibility? How does the unpredictability factor make this policy area special? Which specific cultural-institutional variables might explain different characteristics in different settings?

The structural-instrumental perspective can be linked to the Weberian conceptualization of the bureaucracy as an administrative technology characterized by hierarchical specialization, specialization, formalization and management by rules. From this perspective, coordination through hierarchy is most typical, while coordination through networks has both structural and cultural elements. Networks can be structured in different ways – for example, with actors on the same or at different levels playing the main role (Christensen et al., 2012). The cultural perspective emphasizes coordination through more informal rules and connects networks to a «looser», more informal and perhaps more flexible form of organization compared with that of hierarchy. In general, the siloization and sectorization associated with hierarchical organizations in public administration have been supplemented by partnerships and cooperation across departments (Christensen and

Lægreid, 2007 and 2011). This presupposes changing cultural attitudes and formal structures. Such cultural attributes and norms may be particularly important in «wicked problem»-areas involving multiple actors as well as transboundary, complex and ambiguous issues.

Societal security and crisis management may require networks to help mediate inter-departmental conflicts or interests cross-cutting policy areas, although such networks can be more or less formalized. Organizational flexibility is also important in risk and crisis situations (Czarniawska, 2009). It could be expected that the prospects for coordination through such intermediate institutional arrangements depend on the degree of those arrangements' cultural compatibility with established identities and political-institutional legacies (March and Olsen, 1989).

We may expect that both structural-instrumental and cultural factors to offer relevant insights; and it could be argued that the perspectives need to be merged to understand how hybrid coordination arrangements emerge/evolve. The use of network administrative structures may appear promising, in particular, for typically «wicked problems» related to policy. In practice, however, governance networks do not in themselves resolve coordination problems; nor does the establishment of network administrative arrangements necessarily imply that hierarchies are no longer operative or that all participants have an equal voice. Indeed, there are dynamics between hierarchy and networks (Provan and Kenis, 2008). Often secondary affiliations, such as those between networks and part-time participants, complement primary affiliations, which are those linked to officials' main positions in the hierarchy (Egeberg, 2012). While networks are usually understood as somewhat loose, open-ended and essentially "flat" modes of governance, they may be embedded and operative in the «shadow of hierarchy» (Heretièr and Lehmkuhl, 2008).

Thus we may often observe various *hybrid* coordination arrangements in the governance of societal safety and security, implying that various factors must be taken into account when explaining coordination behavior in crisis management (Moynihan, 2005). One example is the establishment of a «lead agency approach» (Boin, Busuioc and Groenleer, 2013). The notion of a lead agency as an intermediate form between traditional hierarchy and networks is drawn mainly from US government crisis-management arrangements, where a lead agency is responsible for organizing inter-agency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of policy and activities related to a particular operation The lead agency typically chairs an inter-agency working group established to coordinate policy related to that operation , determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies involved and takes responsibility for implementing decisions (Christensen, Danielsen, Lægreid and Rykkja, 2014). At the same time it is associated with a traditional hierarchical approach to coordination since its function is to impose control on others within a network/within the network of which it is part (Boin, Busuioc and Groenleer, 2013). This mixed-system design can be linked to an understanding of public administration based on a large number of diverse, overlapping and potentially competing organizational principles (Olsen, 2010). Thus another important analytical task is to establish the *relative* importance of various factors in this mix of organizational principles and how that mix plays out across various political-institutional settings.

Central concepts

Crisis – definition and typologies

Dealing with disasters and crises is, above all, a government responsibility that has proved increasingly difficult to meet. Crises and disasters tend to pose huge challenges to the political-administrative elites called upon to deal with them (Boin et al., 2005). This is a subject that public administration scholars in particular, have yet to explore at length (Boin and Lodge, 2013; Christensen et al., 2014).

A broadly accepted definition of «crisis» is a situation in which there is a perceived threat against the core values or life-sustaining functions of a social system that requires urgent remedial action in uncertain circumstances (Rosenthal, Charles and 't Hart, 1989). Crises are not commonplace and happen irregularly. They differ from more routine emergencies, such as house fires or traffic accidents, as well as from disasters, which involve a normative judgment and presume a bad outcome (Boin, 2008).

The crucial emphasis in this definition is that a crisis is a matter of perception and hence incorporates a subjective element. A crisis may threaten the core values and pillars of society, which is why government must respond firmly and signal leadership. It influences actors in different ways and often requires both the sensitive balancing of interests and strong negotiation skills in its handling. It also demands a degree of urgency, which means that all possible solutions may not be available. The causes, the options available, the choices made and the consequences of those choices may be both uncertain and complex. Moreover, crises are typically low probability and high impact events, making them especially challenging from a planning and governance perspective. Because they are at the nexus of both democracy and governance – and therefore face demands not only for capacity but also for accountability, legitimacy and representation – public organizations are significantly constrained in their effort to handle crises.

Several authors have pointed to the ongoing absence of a satisfactory typology of crises and disasters (Quarantelli 2001, Gundel 2005). The argument for developing such a typology is simple: «If one wants to know how different types of crises develop, what kinds of problems surround them and, most important, how they can be handled, such a classification would surely be helpful by identifying common traits of different crises» (Gundel, 2005:106). Another argument is that such a typology would be useful for both researchers and practitioners in the field. Classifying crises is the first step to keeping them under control, since only in this way can they be identified and analyzed.

A common differentiation is between man-made and natural crises or disasters (Boin, 2005; Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1993). This focuses on the main causations or features of the crisis. Man-made crises differ from more «classic» natural disasters; examples of the former might include Chernobyl, BSE (Mad Cow Disease), the Challenger accident, 9/11 and the terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in 2011. These crises are typically more complex than natural ones: they change over time and can «travel» great distances; and they may interact with other problems and have a prolonged impact.

The main advantage of such a typology is that differentiation between man-made and natural crises can offer clues on how to deal with the various types of crisis. This approach is often criticized on the grounds that the possible causes of many crises are both interlinked and geographically determined – the prime example being global warming and climate change. Further differentiation into more detailed subsets or distinct types of crisis can help reveal possible countermeasures and the instruments needed to implement them. The natural/man-made distinction can be elaborated by distinguishing between «intended» and «unintended» or between «normal» and «abnormal» crises – both including the human element in the equation (Mitroff and Alpaslan, 2003; Perrow, 2007).

This distinction between natural and man-made crises leads to a discussion of the *causes* of the crisis. It is possible to distinguish between endogenous and exogenous factors (Boin, McConnell and 't Hart, 2008) and between situational crises caused by external forces and institutional crises in which the performance of governing bodies seems to be the main problem ('t Hart, 2014). Causes can be identified at the micro (individual), meso (organizational) or macro (societal/systemic) level. Our focus is primarily on the meso level, where the emphasis is on the role that organizations and organizational processes may play not only in causing but also – and more important – in dealing with crises. An organizational approach, however, does not necessarily mean that individual action or human error does not play a part; nor does it mean that the wider context or environment does not influence how organizations deal with crises. Indeed, «most crises flow from unique configurations of individual errors, organizational failure and environmental flux» (Boin, 2005: 167).

Building resilient organizations is essential (Wildavsky, 1988; Comfort et al., 2010), while the question of the relationship between organizational characteristics, processes and resilience needs further exploring (Boin and van Eeten, 2013). Moreover, the relationship between prevention, preparation, response and recovery is crucial, as is the capacity to act upon and recover from crises and emergencies (Weick and Sutcliff, 2001). Boin (2004) proposes that a way forward may be to employ a form of critical path analysis that identifies turning points within trends and thus key opportunities for policy intervention. We believe such an approach could be helpful in determining the critical points at which decisions must be made and the organizational assets required to deal with the different types of crisis.

Gundel (2005: 108) points out that a problem with many current typologies is that they tend to characterize crises by just one attribute that either applies or does not apply – for example, national or international, episodic or continuous, private- or public-sector. Such classifications can be helpful but require further differentiation if they are to be useful in research. The main drawback is that they tend to be static and therefore often cannot take into the timing of the crisis, new and emerging situations or the type of crisis. Gundel's solution is to introduce two new dimensions into the crisis typology: predictability (either easy or hard) and influence possibilities (either easy or hard), which yields four types of crisis: conventional, unexpected, intractable and fundamental. This approach acknowledges that some crises are harder to predict than others and that some are even impossible to know about ex ante.

Other dimensions can be considered too. Situational and contextual factors – such as the scope and nature of the crisis as well as the track record of political and administrative

executives, policies and institutions – play a role. Boin et al. (2008) distinguish between incomprehensible crises, mismanaged crises and agenda-setting crises. Furthermore, crisis management involves various critical tasks such as sense-making, meaning-making, critical decision-making, coordination, consolidation, terminating, accountability and learning (Boin et al., 2005; Boin and 't Hart, 2012; 't Hart, 2014).

A similar classification distinguishes between four phases or stages: mitigation/ prevention, preparation, response/consequence management and recovery/ aftermath politics (Comfort, Boin and Demchak, 2010). Obviously, different strategies and instruments are available at the different stages; and there are specific challenges related to each phase depending on the type of crisis.

Mitigation signals a higher awareness and more systematic analysis of diverse and emerging risks (related to the vulnerability of physical factors to potential destructive events) from a broad societal perspective. *Prevention* deals with anticipations and the way governments systematically plan and put in place instruments to avoid known risks – for example, through regulation, surveillance and inspection systems. Natural crises may demand systematic monitoring of known or developing risks – for example, through weather reports, fire watches or more direct intervention such as slope stabilization to prevent landslides or constructing more secure housing in earthquake zones. Prevention of intentional man-made crises (terrorism) is even more challenging and uncertain since it involves the erection of not only physical but also normative barriers (Bjørgo, 2013). Full prevention and mitigation is extremely difficult in the face of uncertain and unpredictable events, but effective mitigation may ease prevention problems. Preparedness – in the sense of the organizational structures and resources that are available – is severely constrained by other important priorities. Moreover, different types of crisis require different types of resources. Planning for events that cannot be foreseen at all is difficult, but it may be easier to plan in the case of more "routine" incidents.

Preparation is crucial if prevention is not possible. It includes having policies, structures and resources in place, including both planning and training. Planning and preparation is generally based on experience and past routines that may not be appropriate for future crises. Boin (2008) characterizes the use of detailed plans for crisis management as «planning syndrome» and argues for a more flexible planning approach – one that eschews detailed procedures and focuses more on key principles.

As regards *response/consequence management*, resilience is the main requirement. It is important to contain a crisis or disaster in order to minimize damage and prevent essential systems from collapsing. This may be dependent on prevention and preparation. When it comes to the actual response, time is an important factor (Fleischer, 2013). During a crisis, critical decisions are made under pressure – often in fluctuating organizational settings and with severe constraints on the time and information available for making such decisions (Boin et al., 2005). In this phase of the response, information and communications capacity is crucial.

Recovery/aftermath politics is not only about addressing resilience capacity to return to «normality» and to bounce back, but also about reviewing and learning from the event, which may differ between type of crises and contexts. This reviewing/learning phase often involves accountability processes and blame games. Implementing lessons learned and

making the necessary changes is challenging too (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Finally, the strategic and operative levels are differentiated in all four stages, as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: The various types and phases of crisis

	Man-made crisis		Natural crisis	
	Operational	Strategic	Operational	Strategic
Mitigation/ prevention				
Preparation				
Response/ consequence management				
Recovery/ aftermath politics				

Source: Comfort, Boin and Demchak (2010).

The mitigation of man-made disasters and that of natural disasters share some features, despite the fact these crises differ. The likelihood of preventing a man-made crisis through analysis and awareness is probably stronger than that of preventing natural disasters through such means, but even in the latter case they could help avert flooding and tsunamis, for example. In various ways, coordination is crucial for mitigation and prevention. Systematic analysis demands commitment from political and administrative leaders to ensure the pooling and vertical coordination of resources within a specific sector or organization, but it also requires cross-sectoral and cross-organizational efforts to avoid overlap and tensions. Higher awareness of risks and disasters may be linked to coordinated public information campaigns as well as internal coordinated efforts to change professional cultures.

Preventive efforts are easier to implement alongside mitigation, since mitigation potentially provides a better knowledge base as well as actors who score higher on awareness. The instrumental preconditions for prevention to succeed are related to factors such as the ability to decide on systematic preventive instruments and implement them. And that ability is dependent on existing coordination efforts and capacity – and to an even greater extent the more cross-level and cross-organizational the potential crises are.

Preparation is especially crucial if mitigation and prevention is problematic or poorly functioning. Coordination efforts are particularly important if preparing for multi-level and cross-sectoral crises, and shared planning and training exercises are often crucial too. Both pose instrumental challenges related to potential disagreements between actors, knowledge constraints and coordination problems.

Responding to crises is easier when the mitigation/prevention and/or preparation phases are functioning properly. The containment of a crisis, the limitation of damage and the prevention of essential systems from collapsing all depend on the scope of the crisis

and the time available in which to respond – for example, is the crisis developing gradually or has it taken place suddenly? Response management appears to have the best chance of success when the crisis is limited in scope and developing slowly and when the mitigation, preventive and preparatory measures are in place. If a widespread crisis has developed suddenly and only a handful of preventive and preparatory measures have been taken, it will be very difficult to handle and will prove more challenging in terms of resilience and coordination. Lack of prevention and preparation will also probably mean that factors such as professional culture will be more likely to hamper crisis management.

There are many different aspects to recovery/aftermath politics. First, there is the factor of how easy or difficult it is to return to normality and learn from the crises. Resilience and rebuilding physical structures demand a lot of resources and coordinated efforts by many different public organizations. Learning from crises means not only identifying lessons but also following up on shortcomings and implementing changes. Some may see learning as an objective process, while others may view it as a political process in which meaning-making and influencing actors' interpretations are crucial (Boin et al., 2005; Boin et al., 2008; Ansell et al., 2010). If regarded as an objective process, the pooling of expertise is important. If deemed a political process, avoiding blame or being praised may be the main focus.

Any typology has its limits. It may be useful for analyzing existing cases or types of crisis in order to identify what went wrong and what was handled successfully. Lessons drawn from previous crises may point the way to future solutions, although the latter may not necessarily be transposable to new situations. However, in the end the future is always uncertain and developing tools for crisis management will always be up against uncertainty and unpredictability.

«Wicked problems»: The challenges of specialization and coordination

Within the public sector, societal safety, internal security and crisis management constitute a «wicked problem» for which specialization and coordination between the various actors and organizations (each of which has different tasks and perceptions) is crucial if it is be solved. Such problems transcend organizational boundaries, policy areas and administrative levels. They are typically complex, involving multi-level and multi-sectoral actors as well as uncertain knowledge and ambiguous goals and priorities. Public organizations are severely constrained in their effort to handle those complexities because of a potential mismatch between problem structure and organizational structure.

Crisis management organization has, above all, to do with *specialization* of the formal structure, whether vertical or horizontal (Egeberg, 2012). Vertical specialization involves both the allocation of power between the various levels within a public organization (like a ministry or an agency) and inter-organizational and inter-level issues. In crisis management, relationships between organizations and between the various levels within organizations

often cause tensions. A ministry dealing with societal security frequently has a subordinate agency that is closer to the operative level; and in crisis situations, the degree of autonomy of such an agency and the quality of information it provides for making major central decisions may be crucial. Another important vertical relationship is the one between the central authorities (a ministry or an agency) and the local authorities, the latter of which are more often faced with the practical challenges or operative side of a crisis. On the one hand, a crisis enhances the need for strong leadership and central control at the strategic level; on the other hand, it strengthens the need for local autonomy and flexibility at the operative level. How much autonomy local authorities have in dealing with a crisis is often a crucial question. Local organizational improvisation may be difficult if central constraints are very strong, allowing the local authorities limited leeway only. Local competence, knowledge and training are crucial factors too. A key finding in the crisis literature is that crisis management systems should be decentralized at least to a degree, implying that political and administrative executives should facilitate a self-organized response system rather than trying to control that system (Boin, 2008; Ansell et al., 2010). However, the challenge is how to facilitate a decentralized response system without diluting central responsibilities (Boin et al., 2014).

Horizontal specialization involves the following four principles: purpose, process, clientele and geography (Gulick, 1937). The choice or combination of principles will be crucial for making decisions, implementing them and achieving public goals. Crisis management organization in accordance with the principle of *purpose* involves taking decisions on how and to what extent responsibilities are divided between public organizations at the same level. Some countries have separate internal security or crisis management ministries and agencies that have broad responsibilities within this area. Some opt for a more fragmented horizontal specialization, including establishing special units or agencies for law enforcement, counterterrorism, fire-fighting, health, transportation, flooding, electricity, ICT and so forth. Specialization based on *process* means that actors who deal with the same part of a process or have the same type of expertise are organized together. Specialization based on *clientele* implies a focus on various user groups that could be vulnerable or potentially threatening in a societal security context – for example, suspected terrorist groups. And specialization based on *geography* means focusing on the type, location and size of the physical units, including the division of responsibilities between police districts or regions.

Coordination is a significant challenge and is required throughout a crisis (Ansell et al., 2010; Brattberg, 2012). Kettl (2003) introduced the concept «contingent coordination» to address the need for flexible government capacity to handle new and unpredictable problems in homeland security. The challenge is to move away from a minimalist and negative type of coordination implying non-interference and the tendency to try to avoid damaging other programs towards a more positive type of coordination in which building coherence and improving overall performance is the main goal (Bouckaert et al., 2010; Scharpf, 1988). Thus crisis coordination is not merely a technical task but also an important political activity. It involves not only structure but also culture. Distinguishing between crisis coordination as a process and as an outcome may prove helpful – since «outcome» relates

primarily to crisis cooperation while «process» is more about how to orchestrate and achieve cooperation by connecting the different components (Boin and 't Hart, 2012).

Gulick (1937) emphasized the dynamic relationship between specialization and coordination: the more specialization within a public organization, the more pressure for increased coordination (see also Bouckaert, Peters and Verhoest, 2010). The challenges of structural coordination vary according to the type of specialization (Hood and Jackson, 1991). This tension provides clues about how coordination in crises may function and what the main challenges of the various structural choices may be. When public administration is based on the principle of purpose, for example, the main coordination challenge is generally to make various sectoral administrations work together on cross-sectoral, horizontal and «wicked» problems; when based on process, the main challenge is to get the various professions and experts to cooperate. Clientele-based coordination focuses attention on certain groups and resources and may pose the challenge of how to balance those groups or create a more holistic perspective. Geography-based coordination across all territorial levels challenges both central control and local autonomy, while central coordination of lower-level geographical/territorial units is confronted with the major challenge of national standardization. The unit size may influence the coordination potential; smaller and fragmented units normally pose a challenge mainly to central control, while larger units tend to create larger problems related to internal coordination.

A distinction can be made between the external-internal dimension of coordination and the vertical-horizontal dimension (see Table 2 below). The first distinguishes between coordination within central government and coordination between bodies within and outside central government. The second dimension distinguishes between vertical coordination of central government with international organizations (upward coordination) and local/regional government (downward) and horizontal coordination between organizations at the same level. The vertical dimension addresses sector-specific coordination capacities and the horizontal dimension sector-spanning capacities. Thus the problem of coordination is seen to lie in a multi-sectoral/unit and multi-level system.

Table 2: *The various types of coordination*

	Horizontal coordination	Vertical coordination
Internal coordination	Between various ministries, agencies or policy sectors	Between parent ministry and subordinate agencies/bodies in the same sector
External coordination	With civil society organizations/private-sector interest groups	Upwards to international organizations and downwards to local government

Source: Christensen and Lægreid (2008).

If we take central public administration as the unit of analysis, vertical internal coordination denotes efforts by central political and administrative leaders to coordinate and control sub-ordinate levels/units in the same sector/in their sector or policy area. Vertical external coordination may mean coordination with supra- and/or multi-national organizations or between levels within the country; here the challenge is to balance central control and

regional/local autonomy. Horizontal internal coordination may signify coordination within central government between ministries and agencies. How horizontal coordination is handled in crises may be affected by the task structure of the organizations involved – for example, if that structure is regular or irregular and if the tasks are new or existing (Boin and 't Hart, 2012). Horizontal external coordination may also mean coordination with societal groups, which is often more challenging than vertical coordination.

It is crucial to ensure strict emergency preparedness and robust crisis management, especially in complex and transboundary crises (Ansell et al., 2010). As public administration has increasingly become a multi-actor and multi-level entity, coordination across levels of government and across policy sectors is even more salient than ever (Lægreid et al., 2014). Transboundary crises can escalate along geographical, political and functional lines and produce significant governance challenges (Boin et al., 2014). The increase in transboundary initiatives is seen as a response to the enhanced need for coordination in a fragmented political-administrative system (O'Flynn, Blackman and Halligan, 2013). Coordination in crises often implies facilitating cooperation between network agencies rather than directing such cooperative efforts (t'Hart, 2014). There has been an increased emphasis on inter-organizational coordination across Europe, not least owing aimed at countering the specialized «silos» that were part of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). As a result, a new orientation towards partnerships and cooperation via networks has emerged, often relying on inherently soft measures devised to «nudge» different organizations towards moving in the same direction (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011; Lægreid et al., 2014). Those softer measures and the emphasis on horizontal coordination post-NPM have been accompanied by centralization efforts through the introduction of more hierarchical instruments and stress on vertical coordination, typically under the rubric of «reassertion of the centre» (Christensen et al., 2007; Dahlstrøm, Peters and Pierre, 2011). Hence there are important dynamics between external vertical and horizontal coordination efforts.

These seemingly contradictory modes of coordination are reflected in the way internal security and crisis management is organized in the public sector. When crises arise, various arrangements are introduced to respond to the crisis. Networks that cut across policy areas are often necessary to foster coordination. However, crises tend to demand strong leadership and central direction, clear-cut responsibilities and chains of command throughout the hierarchy (Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014). Actors in the various political-administrative systems choose their own strategies and organizational designs to handle a crisis. These may be a direct instrumental response to the crisis but may reflect perceptions of coordination quality and performance based on existing structural arrangements and cultural traditions.

There is no single optimal way of meeting coordination challenges in a crisis. Three options may be available (Boin and t'Hart, 2012): 1) *professional coordination* based on a template such as that of the US Incident Command System and an expert-based crisis centre like the Federal Emergency Management Agency; 2) *concentrating coordination* achieved by creating and merging stronger crisis-management organizations at the central level, such as the Department of Homeland Security in the US (Hammond, 2007); and 3) *facilitating coordination* achieved by enabling coordinated responses to transboundary

crises through multi-level organizations, such as multi-level crisis governance in the EU (Boin, Busuioc and Groenleer, 2013). How such coordination arrangements work in practice needs to be thoroughly researched.

Governance capacity and legitimacy

A core question is how to enhance problem-solving capacity to deal with crises. So far, we have focused mainly on *governance capacity*, especially types of crisis and coordination. Efficiency, effectiveness, resilience, performance and implementation are fundamental. We have discussed what the major challenges are in the different types of crisis. Of particular interest is the degree of *centralization/decentralization* and to what extent diverging forms of *specialization* and *coordination* are developed in response to new types of risk or crisis. This includes the study of policy development, organizational principles, formal and informal organizational arrangements as well as implementation capacity and crisis management.

An examination of the capacity for societal safety and crisis management may focus on the process of «siloization», which tends to create significant problems of coordination between sectors, administrative levels and organizations (Pollitt, 2003). Within the policy area of societal safety, this process can be seen in the creation of strong line ministries and semi-autonomous agencies with clearly demarcated responsibilities for surveillance, prevention and crisis management. A fragmented organization is especially problematic for handling transboundary and «wicked» problems. At the same time, crisis research emphasizes the decentralized nature of effective crisis-management structures (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013). Within public administration, there is an increasing interest in reforms focusing on integration, horizontal coordination, network arrangements and stronger central government capacity. Recent European-wide research highlights a new emphasis on horizontal coordination in the form of network-based governance arrangements and more holistic instruments aimed at integrating the public sector (Lægreid et al., 2014). However, there is still considerable discrepancy between the amount of attention paid to those arrangements and what we know about how they function (Provan and Kenis, 2008). In general, more research is needed on the relationship between organizational arrangements and performance. Hybrid organizations – including integrated organizations and permanent or temporary crisis organizations – are especially interesting, as is the relationship between the responsible ministry or government office with overarching functions and the strong line ministries and semi-autonomous central agencies. The grey zone between the military and the civil sector (namely, the police) is an example of where sector interests may conflict (Hammond, 2007).

Governance capacity is crucial for crisis management – as is *governance legitimacy*. An under-researched aspect of crisis management is the relationship between crisis capacity and crisis legitimacy. A key challenge is to restore trust in the governance capacity of government arrangements during and after crises. A representative democracy must recognize the links between governance capacity, legitimacy and norms. Accountability is a major challenge – one that implies looking back and requiring people and organizations to

judge their performance (Boin et al., 2008). Office-holders have to account to public forums for their actions prior to and during a crisis.

Public attitudes and reactions to crises can constrain structural arrangements and limit the effectiveness of governance tools that are realistically available. Social capital plays a critical role in building resilience in post-crisis recovery (Aldrich, 2012). Governance norms influence the scope of government and how individual freedoms and societal security are balanced. Only by recognizing the links between governance capacity, legitimacy and norms can a comprehensive knowledge base for societal security organization be created. Identifying factors that may account for variations in the public's trust in its government's capacity for providing both societal security and crisis management is important. As regards governance representativeness, another of area of interest is how crises affect legitimacy and how responsive the various public authorities are to citizens' demands (Christensen et al., 2009). A key assumption is that citizens' attitudes are affected by perceived security risks in their particular environment and, furthermore, by contextual-level factors. In order to illustrate the link between crisis experience and the influence of risk on citizens' attitudes, we can focus on risk assessments carried out by government as a predictor of public attitudes towards government. We assume that the greater the security risk, the more critical the citizens.

Trust in government is one crucial aspect of public attitudes. Analyses of trust in government structures and institutions responsible for societal security and crisis management can be conducted. The same goes for attitudes towards certain preventive measures. Trust is assumed to be sensitive to contextual factors. Does it matter if we start from a high-trust or a low-trust context and are official risk assessments important for public trust in government? What happens to public trust in government and to general attitudes towards various preventive measures post-crisis?

Finally, legitimacy is related not only to risk assessments and the government's ability to deal with crises. Individual rights and civil liberties – such as freedom of expression, religion, mobility, assembly and privacy as well as due process and non-discrimination – are crucial political values in a democratic society. Those rights and liberties may be in conflict with situational imperatives of security, especially during times of national threat and crisis. It is a common assumption that when the perception of threat increases – particularly in the aftermath of major terror attacks – liberties tend to shrink (Fimreite et al., 2013). Value conflicts are at the core of such perceptions Important issues are «security at what cost?» and how to balance civil rights and the rule of law against the need for societal security. To what extent security, on the one hand, and individual rights and civil liberties, on the other, are traded off against one another in various contexts has not been systematically researched. Variations across political systems could be studied in such research and the question of whether those variations depend on political processes and/or various external and societal events explored.

A major issue is how governance capacity for crisis management affects legitimacy and governance representativeness and how responsive the various public authorities are to citizens' demands in this area (Christensen et al., 2009). Another is how trust in government in general and in crisis management institutions in particular affects crisis-management capacity. Thus we are facing co-evolution and mutually reinforcing processes: Governance

capacity can enhance or weaken democratic legitimacy and accountability, but at the same time, governance legitimacy and trust relations can enhance or constrain governance capacity.

An illustrative case: Norwegian crisis management as institutionalization in slow motion

Two shocking terrorist attacks occurred in Norway on 22 July 2011. First, a car bomb destroyed several buildings in the central government complex in the capital of Oslo, including the office of the Prime Minister. Eight people were killed and nine seriously injured in that attack. Less than two hours later, 69 young people from the Labour Party's youth organization attending a summer camp on Utøya Island were shot and killed; 33 others were injured. Both attacks were carried out by an ethnic Norwegian citizen. One year later, his trial demonstrated that he had operated alone. He was judged sane, found guilty and sentenced to 21 years in prison (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja, 2013). The 22 July 2011 attacks dealt a terrible blow to Norway, which is generally regarded as a peaceful, open and robust democracy and has had limited experience of terrorism (Rykkja, Lægreid, and Fimreite, 2011).They were quickly characterized as the most devastating in the country since the Second World War. Government structures for handling crises were put to a severe test.

In Norway, there are a number of public authorities in various sectors and at the various administrative levels that have responsibilities in crisis situations. The policy field is frequently described as disunited or fragmented, resulting in major coordination problems, overlaps and grey areas (Fimreite et al., 2014; Lango, Rykkja and Lægreid, 2011). The coordination problems are generally attributed to the main governance principles in this policy area: namely, liability, decentralization, conformity and cooperation. A rather weak coordinator, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ) is constrained by the principles of ministerial rule and local self-government (Lango, Lægreid and Rykkja, 2013; Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014).

Getting the relevant authorities to cooperate has been a challenge for quite some time. When crises materialize, various network arrangements that cut across policy areas are typically employed in order to foster coordination (as noted above). However, major crises tend to trigger the demand for leadership and central direction and thus pressure to clarify responsibilities and chains of command through more hierarchical structures.

The MJ is responsible for implementing the government's civilian security policy. Besides initiating, developing and implementing measures through its own channels, the ministry directs and coordinates authorities in other policy sectors. Over time, it has moved gradually towards a lead coordination role at the central level but still struggles to secure the necessary authority and coordination capacity (Lango et al., 2013). The Directorate for Civil Protection was established in 2003 as an overarching entity/government body responsible for national preparedness plans, for assisting the ministry in its work and for providing efficient crisis management and communication at all levels during a crisis. It has important control functions over other public bodies but finds it difficult to assert its

authority vis-à-vis the more powerful authorities in the various sectors. The National Security Authority, which is responsible for countering major security threats, is another cross-sectoral authority within the security services. The agency reports to the MJ in civilian matters but is subordinated administratively the Ministry of Defence – thus the potential for conflicts over competency and priorities.

After the tsunami in Southeast Asia in 2004, two new organizations were created to foster better crisis coordination in Norway: the Government Emergency Management Council (GEMC) and the Government Emergency Support Unit (GESU). The GEMC is the superior administrative coordinating body in particularly demanding and complex crises, while the GESU was set up within the MJ to assist the affected administrative authorities/agencies in a crisis. Both can be considered cross-sectoral or network organizations. The terrorist attacks in 2011 revealed important capacity and coordination problems in both organizations (NOU, 2012: 14; Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014).

The process of upgrading the MJ as an overarching coordinating and lead ministry has been slow and rather cautious (Lango et al., 2013). After the terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya in 2011, the government decided to add the principle of cooperation, which prescribes that all public authorities are responsible for ensuring cooperation with other authorities and organizations in the crisis management process. However, this principle does not challenge the overriding principle of responsibility or liability, whereby each line ministry is responsible for societal security and civil protection within the scope of its portfolio. This leaves a rather unclear situation that appears to leave subordinate bodies somewhat confused.

To sum up, coordination across central government is a major challenge within the field of crisis management and preparedness. It is particularly hard to deal with coordination problems in a system where sectorization is strong. Priority has largely been given to coordination by hierarchy, although supplementary network structures, such as the GEMC and the GESU, may have become more important than was previously the case. The role of the agencies under the MJ remains unclear, however. Recent policy documents and reports continue to call for increased coordination. The supplementary network arrangements suffer from unclear mandates, ambiguous powers, insufficient resources and weak governance tools. The administrative apparatus is a conglomerate of semi-autonomous and loosely coupled organizations, each of which has a life of its own. Dominant specialization principles, coordination mechanisms and standard operating procedures constrain the attention and play a role in the way the various authorities work in practice (Fimreite et al., 2014).

Over the last 20–30 years formal arrangements in this policy area have been reorganized in order to switch from a military approach towards a civilian all-hazard one, but the main governance principles have not been challenged. The reorganization can therefore be characterized as cautious and hesitant, even after major crises such as the 2011 terrorist attacks. We are witnessing institutionalization in slow motion through gradual evolution and «mission creep» (Boin et al., 2013). There is permanent tension between current specialization by sector and more recent efforts to establish cross-boundary coordination. The lead agency model is applied to supplement and intermediate between the traditional hierarchy and existing networks. Such arrangements are

introduced in response to the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity that permeate this policy area but have the effect of increasing that complexity and themselves are deployed in uncertain and ambiguous conditions (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja, forthcoming).

Prioritizing resources and securing a focus on crisis management and emergency preparedness is difficult, as is creating the optimal organizations for dealing with such issues. Thus the coordination of resources and authorities with responsibilities in this policy field is a constant challenge. Creating a balance between the hierarchy and networks to ensure proper response, commitment and control as well as the necessary coordination seems to be the "holy grail" of this policy area. Whether the lead agency approach is a viable hybrid organizational innovation requires more analysis and research, but for the time being it seems it could have the potential to offer a flexible organizational form that could be adapted to different situations and contexts. In the Norwegian context, however, such an approach is severely constrained by the principle of ministerial responsibility.

The 2011 terrorist attacks revealed a long-standing need for more focus, increased resources and improved central leadership, authority and coordination. Providing the necessary powers with the adequate tools to ensure control, follow-up, implementation and commitment was crucial. An examination of developments since then shows that the primary structures remain strong, even though calls for more and better coordination have become louder – especially in the wake of the 2011 terrorist attacks. Neither constitutional responsibility nor the principle of ministerial responsibility has been up for discussion. The government has tried to weaken the silo effect of the doctrine by building secondary structures under two complementary strategies (Christensen et al., 2014). First, it has established network arrangements – either permanent or ad hoc – for cross-boundary information-sharing and discussion. A general problem with such entities is that they involve mostly part-time participants whose main loyalty is to their primary position and that meetings tend to be irregular and infrequent. For example, the Ministries' Coordination Consulting Group, established in 2009 after the Audit Office had criticized the MJ's unclear coordination role, has not convened since 2012 (Lango et al., 2014).

Second, the government has sought to introduce an organizational innovation – namely, the *lead agency approach*. The MJ has gradually taken steps towards becoming a lead ministry responsible for coordination and promoting the development of emergency preparedness and crisis management. While that approach does not challenge the principle of ministerial responsibility, the ministry's role nonetheless remains ambiguous. The same applies to the subordinate semi-independent central agencies that are supposed to play a lead role too. They face significant obstacles when trying to become involved in other ministerial areas (Lango et al., 2014). These difficulties would seem to reflect the fact that there is no universal solution. Crises are hard to predict and increasingly complex. Thus a certain level of improvisation and organizational flexibility will always be necessary.

Public security organization cannot be seen as the result of a coherent, planned and wholly hierarchically coordinated process, as expected from a structural-instrumental perspective. There has generally been more agreement about the problem structure than about the organizational structure. Despite long-standing fragmentation and weak coordination, it has been difficult to establish strong new hierarchy-based administrative arrangements that challenge the principle of ministerial responsibility. Instead,

coordination problems are largely tackled by establishing secondary structures based on collegial bodies, boards, councils, networks, informal groups and collaborative arrangements. These supplementary arrangements challenge existing organizational forms but do not overturn them. Many of them are temporary, have no clear mandate and are aimed at handling problems that emerge between organizations; moreover, they are designed to shift away from negative towards positive coordination. The lead organization approach is thus constrained by actors who have their own interests and authority.

Our analysis shows that organizational solutions seem to be in line with the existing historical path of emergency preparedness and crisis management organization as expected from a cultural-institutional perspective. The institutionalized tradition of separate ministerial responsibility remains strong within the Norwegian polity, hampering efforts to strengthen horizontal coordination. So far, there have only been minor organizational changes, reflecting the previous cautious approach. The organizational innovation of a lead agency or ministry has been introduced but is constrained by the principle of ministerial responsibility. This supports the view that established arrangements and institutions are infused with values, identities, traditions, culture and established routines and rules (Selznick, 1957) – all of which have a significant influence on emergency preparedness and crisis management. The relevant institutions and the civil servants employed by them do not easily adjust to changing external pressure or shifting signals from political executives. Thus the policy area is characterized by path dependent processes and political and institutional conflicts (Peters, Pierre and King, 2005). At the same time, this is a policy area that is frequently neglected by politicians until there is a major crisis (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja, 2013). For that reason, political conflicts tend to play out within institutional structures and among civil servants who will defend their institutional territory.

In line with the concept of bounded rationality, the executives of these organizations seem more preoccupied with minimizing decision-making costs than with maximizing goal attainment. Consequently, the status quo is favored and actors opt for solutions that resemble previous ones (Cyert and March, 1963). New organizational solutions have to pass a cultural compatibility test, which is why solutions that do not break fundamentally with existing arrangements tend to be chosen (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993). Earlier decisions constitute an administrative policy heritage that constrains choices at a later stage. For their part, embedded institutional arrangements limit future such arrangements within the area of internal security. The principle of ministerial responsibility has resulted in strong line ministries that defend their portfolio from external intervention. At the same time, the MJ has had somewhat limited discretion and enforcement authority, indicating a change process characterized by strong veto players (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). The room for interpretation about the ministry's role as a coordinator and driving force has been exploited only to a small extent. The MJ seems to have taken a more relaxed approach to the policy field, interpreting its mandate rather narrowly. The result is institutional change characterized by layering – that is, new organizational arrangements have been added, albeit hesitantly, to existing ones.

Another crucial topic is the relationship between structure and culture (Fimreite et al., 2013). Norway's 22 July Commission, which was set up to investigate the emergency

response to the two terrorist attacks in 2011, mainly concluded that the failure of crisis preparedness and crisis management was a cultural and leadership problem, even though most of its analysis was structural (NOU, 2012:14). One year later, a commission established to examine the challenges faced by the police focused on the need for structural changes (NOU, 2013:9). Neither commission addressed the relationship between structure and culture. For this reason it is crucial for research to focus on how specific norms and values among political executives and civil servants can constrain or enable structural changes, administrative reforms and the effective implementation of preferred governance tools.

As regards *governance legitimacy*, the July 2011 terrorist attacks constituted an attack against major interests of the political regime. The targets were symbolic and high profile, while the execution of the attacks was exceptional. It might have been expected that this would accelerate the government's response; however, it did not, which is puzzling (Fimreite, Lango Lægreid and Rykkja, 2013). The historical context, the strength and robustness of democracy in Norway, cultural perceptions and the level of trust in the government and among citizens seem important factors. Norway is generally characterized as a state-friendly society. Most Norwegians see the government as an extension of society rather than as an adversary or threat. This is a key feature of Norwegian society that distinguishes it from many other Western democracies. The combination of trust in the government and friendliness towards the state may help reach an understanding about the comparatively high level of acceptance of counter-terrorist measures among the Norwegian public. Not only institutional trust but also interpersonal trust probably plays a role here. In any case, trust in the political and administrative authorities seems particularly important and deeply rooted in Norway.

Thus self-perceptions, views, identities and institutional practices all appear to have a considerable impact on the balance between security and liberty in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Differences in interpretations reflect past institutional practices and contribute to the different responses to terrorist attacks in different countries. The central political leadership, represented by the Prime Minster, was mostly praised for its handling of the July 2011 terrorist attacks because it was seen to have "risen above" the crisis by talking about democracy, compassion and solidarity, even though there was much to blame it for (Christensen, Lægreid and Rykkja 2013). By contrast, the police, who handled the operative side of the crisis, accepted no blame and showed little empathy; as a result, they received a lot of criticism (Christensen and Lægreid, 2014). This example highlights the often crucial debate related to crisis handling – namely, the accountability debate. The problem of the «many eyes» was obvious (Thompson, 1980). It proved difficult to point to specific office holders or organizations that could be held accountable. No politicians were forced to leave their positions, while the Prime Minister was occupied more with looking ahead towards drawing lessons and making improvements than with looking backwards to allow his own conduct to be judged. Moreover, the parliamentary inquiry concluded half-heartedly that the vague concept of «governmental authorities» was to blame.

Even though the immediate reaction to the 2011 terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya was to call for «more openness, more democracy and more humanity», since then attitudes towards counter-terrorism have normalized and new counter-terrorist measures have been

introduced. However, these cannot be considered as hard-lined as such measures in many other countries.

In Norway, like in other countries faced with potential or actual terrorist attacks, it is likely that the government will want to take preventive steps when the issue of security is current in order to be seen as proactive and fully informed about ongoing developments. By introducing and supporting counter-terrorist measures, politicians and government officials are frequently trying to stave off criticism and avoid blame games. Around the world a new political and managerial climate of «security precautions» has emerged following 9/11 and other international terrorist attacks. The experiences of Oslo and Utøya and the reforms introduced in their wake are part of that international response. However, perceived threat does not exist independently of political and management processes. Risk, along with how it is dealt with and by which organizations, is the product of specific political and organizational contexts. Even in a situation like that in Norway post–22 July, the policies pursued may create opportunities for introducing preventive measures that themselves may be related, albeit remotely, to specific events experienced, lessons learned or attitudes expressed.

The Norwegian case illustrates that national leaders may call for enhanced cooperative crisis management in the wake of a major disaster but are less willing to implement crisis-induced initiatives once the initial shock is over. In fact, policy lock-ins are frequently the norm, making it difficult to advance significantly beyond established patterns and practices (Boin et al., 2013).

Conclusion

In this paper we have put forward several arguments. First, we have argued for the need to address both governance capacity and governance legitimacy when designing an effective crisis management system/a crisis management system that functions well. Second, in order to understand the development and functioning of crisis management arrangements, we have argued in favour of a broad approach based on organization theory – namely, one that combines a structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional perspective. In particular, we have focused on the various arrangements for specialization and coordination as well as the various processes for the institutionalization of crisis management arrangements. Third, we have argued for variation on performance of different organizational arrangements according to type of crisis. In this context, there is a need to develop a useful crisis typology. Fourth, we have stressed the need to study organizational structures as well as processes. Structures both constrain and enable processes but are not the sole determinant of actions because there is always room for manoeuvre and discretion as regards deliberate actions within formal arrangements.

Although crises are frequently associated with damage or loss, they can at the same time pave the way for something new and result in social, political and/or organizational change (Wildavsky, 1988; Kingdon, 1984; 't Hart, 2014). New coordination arrangements seek to integrate crisis management organizations and to foster understanding and joint problem-solving across organizations. One lesson to be drawn is that about the importance

of *political context* (Andrew, 2013). Measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of coordination arrangements is difficult. Hard facts are often missing or difficult to find, and thus most information is based on perceived expert assessments. There is also an attribution problem, since it is not easy to isolate the effects of coordination arrangements from other on-going reforms and changes in public administration. Public-sector coordination addresses not only efficiency and effectiveness but also the wider issues of participation, legitimacy, accountability, trust, power and political control. Certain coordination instruments may be efficient in terms of which resources are used and/or how quickly results are achieved but unsatisfactory from the perspective of stakeholder inclusion and legitimacy. It is often difficult for a single arrangement to yield positive results all round, and normally trade-offs have to be made (see Hood, 1991).

As regards «wicked problems», these are by definition difficult to resolve, partly because presumed changes in social behaviour are not under the control of public-sector institutions. Such problems are typically multi-dimensional, poorly bounded, vaguely formulated and not easily broken down. This makes it very difficult to evaluate the success of the relevant coordination instrument. At the same time, new forms of cooperation pose new challenges with regard to accountability and, consequently, the legitimacy of decision-making and institutions. Accountability relationships become increasingly complex and hybrid in situations where the government acquires a more horizontal and multi-level character (Michels and Meijer, 2008).

Generally, the horizontal inter-organizational coordination seems to supplement rather than replace traditional hierarchical coordination, resulting in more complex organizational arrangements. Making «wicked problems» governable is a big challenge. A stronger emphasis on how to manage networks might be a way forward (O`Flynn et al., 2013). Instead of replacing hierarchy with networks, the establishment of partnership and intermediate organizations offering pragmatic solutions might prove fruitful (Ansell, 2011). Formal elements of a structural-instrumental approach and informal elements of organizations based on institutional-cultural approaches would be combined.

Our main conclusion is that there is no single coordination solution or formula that is optimal for harmonizing competing interests, overcoming uncertainty and ambiguous government structures and making policy choices that everyone will accept. Contemporary government systems in general and societal safety systems in particular are characterized by interdependency and diversity, which puts strong pressure on multi-dimensional coordination issues. Finding a balance between hierarchical instruments and network solutions is complicated and context-dependent, but it may nonetheless be the best way to proceed. A core focus of future research will be how overall performance is affected by capacity and legitimacy and how those two factors interact.

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